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A Suicidal Woman, Roaming Pigs and a Noisy Trampolinist: Refining the ASBO's 
Definition of ‘Anti-Social Behaviour’ 
 
Stuart Macdonald* 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In June 1995 New Labour published the consultation paper A Quiet Life.1  This document 
claimed that consultation with the police, local authorities, councillors and MPs had revealed 
‘intense dissatisfaction with the extent and speed of existing procedures’2 used to tackle anti-
social behaviour.  This ‘system failure’3 meant that ‘new remedies [needed] to be developed.’4  
The remedy which A Quiet Life proposed essentially amounted to a ‘special form of injunction,’5 
breach of which was to be punished with criminal penalties.  In this embryonic form the remedy 
was called the Community Safety Order.  Just over three years later New Labour’s first major 
criminal justice legislation – the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 – received Royal Assent, and the 
new remedy, which by now had been renamed the Anti-Social Behaviour Order (ASBO), found 
pride of place in section 1 of the Act.  Further evolution occurred following the disappointing 
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initial uptake of the ASBO,6 with steps being taken to enhance its effectiveness in the Police 
Reform Act 2002, the Anti-Social Behaviour Act 2003 and the Criminal Justice Act 2003.  After 
these layers of reform we now have a complex regime governing ASBOs, contained in sections 1, 
1A, 1AA, 1AB, 1B, 1C, 1D and 1E of the Crime and Disorder Act (to which will soon be added 
ss1F, 1G, 1H and 1I).7 
Applications for ASBOs may be brought by local authorities, chief officers of local 
police, the British Transport Police, registered social landlords, Housing Action Trusts and 
County Councils.8  Applications may be made to the Magistrates’ Court,9 County Court10 or 
Criminal Court,11 although consultation requirements apply before an application can be made to 
either the Magistrates’ Court or County Court.12  There is also provision for interim ASBOs.13  
The recipient of an Order must be at least 10 years of age, he must have acted in ‘an anti-social 
                                                        
6
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7
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manner, that is to say, in a manner that caused or was likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress 
to one or more persons not of the same household as himself,’ and an ASBO must be considered 
necessary to protect other people from further anti-social acts by him.14  The prohibitions imposed 
by the Order must themselves be necessary to protect people from further anti-social acts by the 
defendant,15 may cover any defined area within, or indeed the whole of, England and Wales,16 
and must last for a minimum of two years (and may be indefinite).17  During the initial two years 
of an Order it may only be discharged with the consent of both parties,18 thereafter either the 
applicant or the defendant may apply for the ASBO to be varied or discharged.19  Breach of the 
Order without reasonable excuse is a criminal offence punishable by up to five years’ 
imprisonment and/or a fine.20  Proceedings for breach may be brought by either the CPS or, in 
certain circumstances, by a local authority.21 
Ever since the publication of A Quiet Life there has been strong opposition to the ASBO.  
As the new remedy made its journey onto the statute book six leading academics (Andrew 
Ashworth, John Gardner, Rod Morgan, ATH Smith, Andrew von Hirsch, and Martin Wasik – 
hereafter Ashworth et al) wrote a series of three articles in which they condemned the ASBO as 
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‘Howardism with a vengeance’ and called for it to be abandoned.22  More recently, the 
Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council for Europe has expressed a number of severe 
misgivings about the ASBO,23 and NAPO concluded their analysis of the ASBO’s first six years 
by stating that a fundamental review of the use and appropriateness of the Order is needed.24  An 
organisation named ASBO Concern has also been set up to campaign for a full public 
government review of ASBOs and to highlight alternative ways of tackling anti-social behaviour, 
and has attracted support from organisations ranging from the Institute of Ideas and the Green 
Party to Mind and the National Autistic Society.25   
Notwithstanding this mounting dissatisfaction, the aim of this article is not to argue that 
we do not need ASBOs.26  The Government regard the remedy as a ‘key part’27 of their campaign 
against anti-social behaviour.  This has been endorsed by the Home Affairs Committee, who in 
their report on anti-social behaviour rejected many of the objections held by critics of the Order – 
stating that the inappropriate issuing of ASBOs is not a major problem in practice, that where 
Orders contain widely drafted terms it is relatively straightforward to apply for the Order to be 
varied, and that the ASBO’s combination of civil and criminal law is not unique and is analogous 
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to an injunction – and welcomed it as ‘an effective tool which gives relief to communities.’28  
Given the Home Affairs Committee’s support for the ASBO, coupled with the continued increase 
in the rate at which Orders are issued,29 this article proceeds on the assumption that ASBOs will 
continue to feature prominently in the Government’s efforts to tackle anti-social behaviour.  Its 
aim is to argue that, if the ASBO is to remain at the forefront of the campaign against anti-social 
behaviour, the definition of anti-social behaviour found in s1(1)(a) of the Crime and Disorder Act 
1998 should be refined so as to focus the Order upon the sort of case for which it was originally 
designed. 
One of the difficulties in pinning down an exact meaning for anti-social behaviour is that 
it is an expression which carries different weight according to its context.30  It will be shown that, 
when New Labour first proposed the creation of the ASBO, they intended that the new remedy 
would be used against individuals who persistently commit criminal acts in a particular area.  The 
Order was designed to provide a mechanism for imposing a composite sentence, reflecting the 
aggregate impact of the perpetrator’s behaviour, in circumstances where, if he was successfully 
prosecuted for any of his criminal acts, the likely penalty would not reflect the overall effect of 
his behaviour on those living there.  However, the imprecision of the term anti-social behaviour 
allowed a gradual form of mission creep.31  Even before the ASBO came into force, the 
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Government extended the behaviour targeted by the Order to cover both criminal and ‘sub-
criminal’ activity within residential neighbourhoods.32  By 2002 things such as begging, 
prostitution and graffiti had been added to the list of behaviours deemed anti-social, reflecting a 
wider ‘sanitising agenda.’  Anti-social behaviour was no longer being used simply to connote 
‘aggressive or selfish individual behaviour affecting neighbours.’  Rather, it had been ‘adopted … 
to describe a diverse mix of environmental and human incivilities that affect neighbourhoods in a 
more impersonal and generalised way.’33   
This rapid growth in the scope of the ASBO is further illustrated by the creation of the 
post conviction ASBO.  Introduced by the Police Reform Act 2002, the CRASBO (as it has come 
to be known) raises a number of fundamental questions.  Is it properly classified as a civil order, 
or is it in nature a criminal penalty?34  Is it appropriate to use a CRASBO to increase the penalty 
for a particular crime, in order to increase the deterrent effect of the prohibition contained in the 
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 Home Office Anti-Social Behaviour Orders – Guidance (London: Home Office, 1999).  For a description 
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general law, on the ground that the general sanction has failed to deter the particular offender?35  
Is it appropriate to impose a CRASBO which takes effect upon an offender’s release from 
custody?36  And can the maximum sentence of five years’ imprisonment for breach of a CRASBO 
be justified?37  Notwithstanding these concerns, as well as the fact that the use of the ASBO as 
another sentencing option is ‘a far cry from the original vision,’38 the post conviction ASBO has 
become a popular way of controlling persistent offenders.  This is attested by the fact that 
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offences, with the earlier offences operating as an aggravating factor (Criminal Justice Act 2003, s143(2)).  
Treating the earlier offences as an aggravating factor of the current offence may be distinguished from 
punishing the individual twice for those earlier offences. 
38
 E. Burney Making People Behave: Anti-Social Behaviour, Politics and Policy (n 33 above), 94. 
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CRASBOs accounted for 71 per cent of all ASBOs issued between November 2002 and 
September 2004.   
This articles begins by outlining the debate over the definition of anti-social behaviour in 
s1(1)(a).  It will be shown that, whilst the concerns of critics of the definition were rooted in a 
distrust of state power, at the heart of New Labour's approach lay a confidence that enforcement 
agencies could be entrusted with the wide-ranging discretion conferred by s1(1)(a).  The article 
will then go on to argue that enforcement agencies’ use of the ASBO has shown this confidence 
to have been ill-founded. 
In their report on anti-social behaviour the Home Affairs Committee remarked: 
 
It is telling that those who criticised the current definitions of anti-social behaviour did 
not themselves propose any alternative definitions, whether by reference of a suggested 
list of behaviours which could properly be considered anti-social or by any other means.  
This may well demonstrate the difficulty of adopting a different approach from that 
which forms the basis of the current legislation.39 
 
The final part of the article will accordingly suggest, first, three ways in which s1(1)(a) might 
helpfully be qualified and, second, that two further clauses should be added to s1(1).  It will be 
argued that, by focussing the ASBO upon the sort of case for which it was designed, these 
amendments succeed in placing a bar on the use of the ASBO as a heavy-handed instrument of 
social control, thereby encouraging greater resort to other, more constructive, forms of 
intervention. 
 
THE DEBATE OVER s1(1)(a)’s DEFINITION OF ANTI-SOCIAL BEHAVIOUR 
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The claimed benefits of the definition 
 
During the parliamentary passage of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, New Labour 
resisted opposition amendments aimed at tightening s1(1)(a)’s definition of anti-social 
behaviour.40  Home Office spokesman Alun Michael insisted that ‘The essence of such orders is 
their flexibility to respond to local needs’41 and that ‘Widely drawn legislation with clarity of 
purpose, and with clear expectations placed on those who use it, can be a flexible method.’42  In 
their report on anti-social behaviour the Home Affairs Committee agreed, concluding that the 
flexibility of the definition in s1(1)(a) has proved to have a number of advantages.  Practitioners 
have found the definition simple to use as practical difficulties in applying the legislation have 
been avoided.  The definition has generated a more strategic response to anti-social behaviour as, 
for instance, local authority anti-social behaviour units have begun to emerge.  And s1(1)(a) has 
allowed the definition of anti-social behaviour to be worked out locally.43  
There is also a further justification for the definition in s1(1)(a).  In support of their claim 
that a system failure had prevented anti-social behaviour being tackled effectively, New Labour 
explained that the criminal law focuses on single events, which means that it is ill-equipped to 
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 The amendments included inserting the word ‘serious,’ requiring that the behaviour would have caused 
harassment, alarm or distress to a person of reasonable firmness, requiring that the defendant intended to 
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 ibid, col 70. 
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Behaviour (London: Home Office, 2004). 
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deal with a course of conduct where the overall impact of the behaviour is far greater than the 
sum of its parts: 
 
[T]he criminal justice system tends to treat the commission of crime as an acute, rather 
than a chronic condition.  The system is therefore at its least effective where the 
offending behaviour is chronic and persistent, where the separation of incidents may lack 
forensic worth, where it is the aggregate impact of criminal behaviour which makes it 
intolerable and where the whole is much worse than the sum of its parts.  Serious anti-
social behaviour by neighbours is perhaps the best example of chronic crime.44 
 
The practical importance of this is that, if a course of anti-social behaviour is broken up 
into a number of discrete offences, the penalties imposed for each individual offence do not 
‘reflect the impact on neighbours of all that was being done.’45  The ASBO mechanism was 
designed to remedy this.  New Labour insisted that breach of an ASBO should be seen as the 
continuation, in defiance of a court order, of a course of anti-social behaviour.  The sentence 
imposed for breach should therefore reflect the impact of the entire course of conduct.46  In order 
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 A Quiet Life (n 1 above), 6. 
45
 Alun Michael (HC Standing Committee B col 48 30 April 1998). 
46
 It was on this basis that New Labour sought to justify the severe maximum sentence for breach of an 
ASBO.  When asked why the maximum penalty for breaching an ASBO was greater than the three year 
maximum penalty for the offence of affray (Public Order Act 1986, s3), Alun Michael replied that affray 
‘involves one incident – maybe one moment of madness involving a group of people.  Here we are 
discussing a pattern of behaviour that is damaging people’s lives over a considerable period of time’ (HC 
Standing Committee B col 138 5 May 1998).  Similarly, during the House of Lords debates on the Crime 
and Disorder Bill Lord Williams asked the House of Lords to imagine a situation where a course of serious 
anti-social behaviour had been continuing for some time, then continued: ‘We reach the situation where the 
 11 
for this mechanism to work, however, it is essential that the definition in s1(1)(a) covers the many 
diverse forms of anti-social behaviour, since otherwise relevant behaviour could be excluded 
from the consideration of a court hearing an application for an Order, which would mean that, 
should the ASBO later be breached, the sentencing court would not be able to take that behaviour 
into account when passing sentence.  The definition of the behaviour which may give rise to an 
Order must therefore encompass all potential forms of anti-social behaviour.  A flexible definition 
guarantees this. 
 
Critics’ objections to the definition 
 
From when the ASBO was first proposed critics expressed concerns about the vagueness 
and breadth of the definition and about the degree of discretion which it would confer on 
enforcement agencies.  Its vagueness, they argued, meant that it would infringe the rule of law by 
‘[failing] to give fair warning to citizens of what kind of conduct may trigger these powers.’47  Its 
                                                                                                                                                                     
only redress for the individual citizen … is to try to establish through the relevant authority (a local 
authority or the police) that the order is required. If behaviour of that kind continues time and again even 
after the offender has been brought to court, even after the proceedings have been introduced, there may 
well be extreme circumstances where a five-year sentence would be justified. I can easily conceive of those 
circumstances’ (HL Deb vol 585 cols 604-605 3 February 1998). 
47
 Ashworth et al ‘Overtaking on the Right’ (n 22 above), 1501.  They further argued that the wording of 
s1(1)(a) would breach Article 7 ECHR unless it was ‘tightened up considerably’ (‘Clause 1 – The Hybrid 
Law from Hell?’ (n 22 above), 26).  However, this argument presupposes that proceedings for the 
imposition of an ASBO are criminal, not civil, in substance (see n 91 below).  Plus, in practice a crime has 
to be very loosely defined indeed to breach Article 7 (see, eg, R v Rimmington & Goldstein [2005] UKHL 
63, Kokkinakis v Greece (1994) 17 EHRR 397 and Steel v United Kingdom (1999) 28 EHRR 603; see 
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breadth, meanwhile, had an austerity which many found disquieting.  Ashworth et al found the 
provision ‘unpleasantly reminiscent of powers granted in former East Germany to housing block 
committees – which also had unrestricted powers to regulate residents’ lives,’48 adding that even 
the scope of the ‘sweeping and highly controversial’ offences created by sections 4A and 5 of the 
Public Order Act 1986 was not as broad as that of s1(1)(a),49 whilst Liberal Democrat peer Lord 
Rodgers questioned whether the ‘disturbingly authoritarian overtones of “anti-social behaviour”’ 
are consistent ‘with the spirit and language of a free society.’50  The critics’ anxiety was 
exacerbated by the fact that the definition of anti-social behaviour in s1(1)(a) looks only to the 
effect the defendant’s behaviour had/would have been likely to have on the victim, which, they 
argued, meant that there were no safeguards within the legislation for those cases in which the 
victim is oversensitive or bigoted. 
The critics were also concerned that the definition in s1(1)(a) amounted to an abdication 
of legislative responsibility, resulting in a ‘huge transfer to local officials of the power effectively 
to criminalise conduct.’51  They were quick to point out the magnitude of the task being imposed 
on both enforcement agencies and the courts.  Lord Bingham, who welcomed the provisions of 
the Act as ‘imaginative and well designed,’ nevertheless urged that ‘the fair operation of these 
procedures will, I think, call for very great judgment and restraint on the part of those seeking, 
making and enforcing some of these orders.’52  Others were less optimistic.  Lord Dholakia, 
drawing a parallel with stop and search legislation, cautioned that ‘the clause could be misused … 
                                                                                                                                                                     
further R. White ‘Anti-Social Behaviour Orders Under Section 1 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998’ 
(1999) 24 EL Rev HR 55). 
48
 ‘Neighbouring on the Oppressive’ (n 22 above), 9. 
49
 ibid, 8. 
50
 HL Deb vol 584 cols 544-545 16 December 1997. 
51
 Ashworth et al ‘Neighbouring on the Oppressive’ (n 22 above), 9. 
52
 HL Deb vol 584 col 560 16 December 1997. 
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[T]he authorities could use it to target particular communities,’53 a view echoed by Ashworth et 
al: 
 
Even if the police and local authorities can be trusted to be scrupulous in avoiding 
discrimination [on grounds of race, religion, sex, sexual orientation or disability] – and 
we are not sure that they can – this is no obstacle to these orders being used as weapons 
against other unpopular types, such as ex-offenders, ‘loners,’ ‘losers,’ ‘weirdos,’ 
prostitutes, travellers, addicts, those subject to rumour and gossip, those regarded by the 
police or neighbours as having ‘got away’ with crime, etc.54 
 
New Labour’s response to the critics’ objections 
 
New Labour’s response to these concerns about the definition of anti-social behaviour 
was threefold.  First, they argued that it is unnecessary to define anti-social behaviour any more 
precisely since, ‘although it is difficult to define, one is certainly able to recognise such behaviour 
when one sees it.’55  Alun Michael claimed that, like an elephant on the doorstep, anti-social 
behaviour is ‘easier to recognise than to define:’56   
 
It is wise to recognise an elephant on the doorstep.  That is why we are not trying in the 
order to define the elephant on the doorstep too narrowly.57 
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 HL Deb vol 585 cols 536-537 3 February 1998. 
54
 ‘Neighbouring on the Oppressive’ (n 22 above), 9 (see also S. Cracknell ‘Anti-Social Behaviour Orders’ 
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Second, New Labour pointed to a filtering process within the legislation which, they 
believed, would ‘ensure that such orders are not used for trivial behaviour.’58  Individuals seeking 
the imposition of an ASBO must go to one of the enforcement agencies and ask them to apply.  
New Labour argued that if the person’s complaint is frivolous or vexatious, they are likely to 
‘receive a very short answer.’59  This is buttressed, first, by the requirement that there be 
consultation before an application is brought,60 and, second, by the guidance published by the 
Home Office.  And even if the relevant authority were to apply for an Order in an undeserving 
case, it would still have to convince a court – who, according to s1(4), has complete discretion 
whether or not to make an Order – to impose an ASBO.  New Labour’s confidence in courts 
hearing applications for ASBOs was reinforced, first, by the requirement that they disregard any 
act of the defendant which he shows was ‘reasonable in the circumstances,’61 and, second, by the 
stipulation that an Order may only be imposed if it is ‘necessary to protect [others] from further 
anti-social acts by [the defendant].’62  And finally, the requirement that an ASBO be imposed for 
at least two years was designed to indicate, both to the authority applying for an ASBO and to the 
                                                        
58
 Alun Michael (HC Standing Committee B col 46 30 April 1998). 
59
 Lord Williams (HL Deb vol 585 col 566 3 February 1998). 
60
 Although an application may still be brought if there is no agreement on consultation, the application is 
likely to be weakened as a result (see Home Office A Guide to Anti-Social Behaviour Orders and 
Acceptable Behaviour Contracts (London: Home Office Communication Directorate, 2002), 25-26). 
61
 s1(5).  Although s1(5)’s effectiveness in filtering out undeserving cases is hampered by the placing of the 
burden of proof on the defendant. 
62
 s1(1)(b). 
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court hearing the application, that only conduct serious enough to warrant an Order of that 
duration should result in an ASBO being imposed.63   
The third reason which New Labour gave for rejecting the concerns of the critics was that 
enforcement agencies and courts can be trusted to exercise the discretion vested in them 
responsibly, a view captured neatly by the following remark:   
 
My constituents know what anti-social behaviour is … Do Opposition Members distrust 
the judgment of the police and the courts so much that they believe that they cannot judge 
anti-social behaviour when they see it?64 
 
The different views of state power 
 
What emerges from this examination of the critics’ objections to the definition in 
s1(1)(a), and New Labour’s response to these objections, is that the difference of opinion flows 
fundamentally from different perspectives on how state power should be viewed.  The critics 
approached the task of defining anti-social behaviour on the footing that state power should be 
viewed with suspicion.  A clear, tightly-drawn definition is essential, they argued, so that 
individuals can plan their affairs safe in the knowledge that if their actions fall outside the range 
of clearly proscribed behaviour the State will have no recourse against them.  Similarly, the 
eccentric, the unconventional and the unpopular should be protected against the discriminatory 
use of the legislation by a tightly-drawn definition which clearly excludes them from its scope.  In 
                                                        
63
 See HC Standing Committee B col 46 30 April 1998 and HL Deb vol 585 col 571 3 February 1998.  
Whether this is how the two-year minimum duration has operated in practice is open to question – 
anecdotal evidence suggests that at least some magistrates impose two-year ASBOs in cases where they do 
not feel an Order of that length is justified, on the basis that they have no power to impose a shorter Order. 
64
 Former Labour MP Helen Clark (née Brinton) (HC Standing Committee B col 69 30 April 1998). 
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short, clarity and tightness of definition is needed to protect those undeserving of an Order from 
having one imposed on them.  At the heart of New Labour’s approach, by contrast, is a more 
benevolent view of state power.  Whilst the definition of anti-social behaviour is admittedly 
broad, any risk of uncertainty is offset by the fact that everyone knows what behaviour is anti-
social and so knows how (not) to behave.  Plus, in practice ASBOs will only be imposed in 
deserving cases since those vested with discretion can be relied upon to exercise it responsibly 
and to operate the filtering process effectively.  A clear, tightly-drawn definition to protect the 
eccentric, the unpopular, and anyone else not engaging in serious anti-social behaviour is thus 
unnecessary.  The state can be trusted to exercise their widely-drawn powers against only those 
individuals who are guilty of serious anti-social behaviour.  Moreover, a widely-drawn definition 
offers a flexible tool which courts and enforcement agencies can be trusted to utilise to ensure the 
legislation is effective in tackling all forms of anti-social behaviour that require a response.   
This benevolent view of state power stands in marked contrast to the rhetoric which 
surrounded the introduction of the Human Rights Act 1998.  At the second reading of the Human 
Rights Bill in the House of Lords, Lord Williams exclaimed that ‘The traditional freedom of the 
individual under an unwritten constitution to do himself that which is not prohibited by law gives 
no protection from misuse of power by the state.’65  When he introduced the Bill to the 
Commons, Jack Straw also stressed the importance of human rights legislation and the potential 
for the state to misuse the power vested in it.  Ironically, these comments came at the same time 
that the Crime and Disorder Bill was passing through the Lords, and less than two months before 
Straw himself introduced the Crime and Disorder Bill, including the ASBO provisions, to the 
Commons: 
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[This Bill will enable] citizens to challenge more easily actions of the state if they fail to 
match the standards set by the European convention … Nothing in the Bill will take away 
the freedoms that our citizens already enjoy.  However, those freedoms … need to be 
complemented by positive rights that individuals can assert when they believe that they 
have been treated unfairly by the state, or that the state and its institutions have failed 
properly to protect them.66 
 
Although this discrepancy was pointed out by several commentators,67 Home Office 
policy has continued to be characterised by a benevolent view of state power.  Former Home 
Secretary David Blunkett delivered a number of speeches in which he urged ‘the vital role of 
good, trusted government in ensuring freedom and security,’68 arguing that a close partnership 
between State and citizen is essential: 
 
We need to move towards a new compact between government and governed.  This 
means responsibilities and duties resting with the individual and community as well as 
with the Government, the politics of something-for-something, with rights and 
responsibilities going hand in hand.  This is an extension of the family, where mutual 
help has to be balanced by willingness to self-help.69 
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The freedom and security which this compact is designed to protect are threatened not by 
the State, but by law-breakers.  ‘Parliament must be able to act on behalf of the people,’ Blunkett 
argued.  ‘Democracy and legitimacy of politics itself depends not on protecting people from the 
will of Parliament, but protecting people from the actions of dangerous criminals on our streets.’70  
Indeed, those who warn of the danger of unchecked state power threaten to hamper the compact 
between government and governed, and in so doing jeopardise the attainment of freedom and 
democracy –  ‘Those extremists who see the State itself as inherently bad would leave us open to 
a collapse in order and, in turn, the end of democracy and freedom.’71  As far as civil liberties are 
concerned, ‘You do not erode the rights of the honest, of the innocent, by increasing the rights of 
victims and the protection of witnesses.’72  After all, he argued, civil liberties are as much about 
the protection of the innocent as about protecting the rights of defendants.  In reality, then, 
protecting civil liberties and defending the democratic state are ‘two sides of the same coin.’73 
Blunkett’s successor as Home Secretary, Charles Clarke, has demonstrated a similar 
willingness to entrust the executive with wide-ranging powers.  For example, he responded to 
concerns that the Racial and Religious Hatred Bill (passed by the Commons in July 2005) could 
be used to prosecute those who vigorously debate matters of religion or who proselytise by 
pointing to the fact that the police will be issued with guidance notes and that prosecutions may 
only be brought with the consent of the Attorney-General.74  In a similar vein, when the Home 
Office initially proposed the introduction of a new control order, both derogating and non-
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derogating control orders were to be made by the Home Secretary.  Conceding that the use of 
such powers, which could include the house arrest without trial of British citizens, would be ‘a 
very grave step,’ Clarke stated that ‘a lot of the discussion around this revolves around the extent 
to which I as Home Secretary, or the Prime Minister, or the Head of the Security Services or the 
Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police can be trusted with the assessments that we make.’75  
Although the pressure exerted by Opposition parties ultimately meant that the legislation took a 
different shape to that originally proposed,76 Clarke’s willingness to vest such ‘grave’ powers in 
the executive was clear.  This continued willingness to legislate on the basis that the state can be 
trusted with wide-ranging powers raises fundamental questions about how the relationship 
between state and citizen should be conceived, and casts doubt upon the importance which New 
Labour professedly attach to human rights. 
 
The extravagant version of the rule of law  
 
It is of course possible to take a more cynical view of New Labour’s insistence that 
enforcement agencies can be trusted to exercise responsibly the discretion which the definition of 
anti-social behaviour in s1(1)(a) vests in them.  On this view such pronouncements are merely a 
stance employed as rhetoric to conceal a blunt and unprincipled decision to sacrifice safeguards 
which protect against the abuse of state power in order to pursue the politically motivated goal of 
reducing anti-social behaviour.  However, this does not rule out the possibility of a benevolent 
view of state power, which at least one of New Labour’s critics – Baroness Helena Kennedy – 
seems to consider can be sincerely held.  In the third of her series of Hamlyn Lectures Kennedy 
explained that: 
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Once people ‘are the state’ or have their hands on the levers of the state they have 
amnesia about the meaning of power and its potential to corrupt.  They forget the basic 
lessons that safeguards and legal protections are there for the possible bad times which 
could confront us, when a government may be less hospitable, or when social pressures 
make law our only lifeline.  They forget that good intentions are not enough, that 
scepticism about untrammelled power is essential.  No state should be assumed benign, 
even the one you are governing.77 
 
Taking as their starting point the view that state power should be seen with suspicion, 
some jurists have expounded what Kenneth Culp Davis labelled ‘the extravagant version of the 
rule of law.’78  The foundation of this version of the rule of law is the belief that discretionary 
power has no place in any system of law or government; government, in all its actions, should be 
bound by rules fixed and announced beforehand – a sentiment well captured by the slogan ‘where 
law ends, there tyranny begins.’79  However, such accounts of the rule of law ignore the stark 
reality that no legal system can operate without significant discretionary power.  They ‘express an 
emotion, an aspiration, an ideal, but none is based upon a down-to-earth analysis of the practical 
problems with which modern governments are confronted.’80  As Bradley and Ewing have 
observed, ‘If it is contrary to the rule of law that discretionary authority should be given to 
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government departments or public officers, then the rule of law applies to no modern 
constitution.’81 
Given the inevitability of discretion in every legal system, proponents of the extravagant 
version of the rule of law seek to eliminate as much discretion as possible from the legal sphere.  
Beyond this they urge the need to ‘bring such discretion as is reluctantly determined to be 
necessary within the “legal umbrella” by regulating it by means of general rules and standards 
and by subjecting its exercise to legal scrutiny.’82  However, this approach proceeds on the 
mistaken assumption that there is a neat dichotomy between rules and discretion.  Rules are 
erroneously contrasted with discretion ‘as if each were the antithesis of the other.’83  As Keith 
Hawkins argues, the distinction between the two is far more uncertain: 
 
Discretion is heavily implicated in the use of rules: interpretative behaviour is involved in 
making sense of rules, and in making choices about the relevance and use of rules.  At the 
same time, it is clear that rules enter the use of discretion: much of what is often thought 
to be the free and flexible application of discretion by legal actors is in fact guided and 
constrained by rules to a considerable extent.  These rules, however, tend not to be legal, 
but social and organizational in character.84 
 
Proponents of the extravagant version of the rule of law also fail to recognise that the 
exercise of discretion may be beneficial.  In areas which are especially complex, discretionary 
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decision-making enables difficult issues to be addressed on a case-by-case basis.85  Discretion 
also avoids undue rigidity.  As the evolution of the Court of Chancery illustrates, discretion may 
be necessary to enable a decision-maker to do justice.86  And, whilst there are a number of 
dangers associated with discretionary decision-making – such as the possible use of illegitimate 
criteria, the risk of inconsistencies of outcome, and the potential for arrogant, careless decision-
making – these dangers can only be expressed in general terms and so, as Nicola Lacey warns, 
their application in a particular context should not be accepted as ‘unproblematic truth.’  Rather, 
one must engage in the ‘social science project of detailed examination of discretion in particular 
contexts informed by an appreciation of the agents’ own understandings and the experiences of 
clients and other participants’ in order to determine whether or not any of these concerns apply in 
a particular context.87  This raises the question whether the critics’ concerns about the definition 
of anti-social behaviour in s1(1)(a) were in fact ill-founded, or whether the use made of the 
ASBO has shown these concerns to have been justified.  To answer this, it is necessary to 
examine the use of the ASBO to date. 
 
THE USE OF ASBOs TO DATE 
 
The opening words of A Quiet Life indicated the intended target of the ASBO: 
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Every citizen, every family, has the right to a quiet life – a right to go about their lawful 
business without harassment or criminal behaviour by their neighbours.  But across 
Britain there are thousands of people whose lives are made a misery by the people next 
door, down the street or on the floor above or below.  Their behaviour may not just be 
unneighbourly, but intolerable and outrageous.88 
 
Two case studies were employed to illustrate the sort of behaviour contemplated.89  The 
first of these concerned John and David Finnie, aged 29 and 27 respectively, who lived on the 
Stoke Heath estate in Coventry.  They were allegedly responsible for a series of crimes on the 
estate, including burglary, harassment, intimidation and fire bombing.  Coventry City Council had 
been faced with a very high level of requests for rehousing from tenants in the area, a 
disproportionate amount of staff time had been spent dealing with complaints from tenants about 
burglary and intimidation, and a number of council properties had stood vacant for excessively 
long periods.  At the time A Quiet Life was published, the Council had obtained an ex parte 
interlocutory injunction under section 222 of the Local Government Act 1972 which prohibited 
the brothers from entering a one-mile exclusion zone on the estate.  This succeeded in giving the 
inhabitants of the estate some respite.  However, at the ex parte hearing hearsay evidence had 
been admissible, so it had not been necessary to identify witnesses in order to obtain the 
injunction.  When the brothers subsequently applied to have the injunction set aside, the Council 
were forced to withdraw from the action because they had been unable to persuade more victims 
to come forward.90  Coventry’s chief housing officer thus concluded, ‘The harassment and 
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intimidation which we were trying to tackle, is the very issue which prevents us from moving 
forward.’91 
The second case study concerned Family X from Blackburn.  The five members of this 
family been arrested a total of 54 times for offences including attempted robbery, burglary, theft, 
criminal damage and public disorder.  The superintendent of the local police wrote, ‘This family 
are causing great distress among their neighbours who feel that the situation is close to 
intolerable.’92  According to A Quiet Life, however, ‘each incident of criminal behaviour was 
dealt with in isolation,’ which meant that the family’s ‘frequent court appearances rarely ended in 
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much more than a fine, conditional discharge or other non-custodial sentences.’93  As explained 
previously, the ASBO mechanism was designed to remedy this. 
Proponents of the definition of anti-social behaviour in s1(1)(a) have argued that its 
principal benefit is its flexibility.  A distinction must be drawn, however, between having the 
flexibility to invoke the legislation against the variety of forms of anti-social behaviour that might 
cause a serious level of harassment, alarm or distress and which are so ‘intolerable and 
outrageous’ as to be properly made the subject of a criminal sanction, and having the licence to 
invoke the legislation in contexts which are quite different to that for which it was designed.  This 
is important because a person can be caused harassment, alarm or distress in lesser situations 
which only amount to inconvenience, embarrassment or ‘unneighbourly’ conduct.  A wife might 
be caused harassment, alarm or distress if, keen to impress her new boss, she invites him and his 
wife for dinner, only for her husband to get drunk, make lewd remarks and belch at the dinner 
table.  At the other extreme to the husband’s behaviour is that of the offender who commits a 
serious assault, thereby causing harassment, alarm and distress to his victim, to the victim’s 
friends and family, and to others living in the vicinity of the attack.  The ASBO was designed to 
be a means of tackling nuisance neighbours like the Finnie brothers and Family X, who have 
made others’ lives a misery by persistently committing criminal acts and have intimidated 
witnesses into silence.  But the breadth of the definition in s1(1)(a) has allowed enforcement 
agencies the freedom to invoke the ASBO in quite different contexts. 
Anecdotal examples of draconian uses of ASBOs are becoming increasingly popular.  
Many of these examples concern Orders with unnecessarily wide-ranging prohibitions.  For 
example, in addition to the well-publicised ASBO which, inter alia, prohibited 87 year-old great-
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grandfather Alexander Muat from making sarcastic remarks to his neighbours,94 an ASBO has 
been imposed on a pirate DJ who ran an illegal radio station from the top of a tower block 
banning him from entering any building more than four storeys tall,95 and on a prolific car thief 
which banned him from entering any car park in England or Wales.96  Such Orders are possible 
because section 1(6) of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 does not limit a court to prohibiting 
repetition of the defendant’s anti-social behaviour.  Rather it permits the imposition of any 
prohibitions deemed ‘necessary for the purpose of protecting persons … from further anti-social 
acts by the defendant.’  Thus, no distinction is made between the anti-social behaviour 
perpetrated by the defendant and behaviour which is necessarily prior to his anti-social behaviour.  
Hence the pirate DJ was banned not just from making illegal broadcasts on the roof of tower 
blocks, but from entering any building more than four storeys tall – even if his purpose was 
merely to visit someone who lived there.  And the car thief was banned not just from persisting in 
car crime, but from entering any car park anywhere in the country – even if he was parking in a 
supermarket car park to go shopping.  Orders with widely-drafted prohibitions such as these may 
be open to challenge under Articles 8, 10 and/or 11 ECHR.  For whilst the infringement of the 
defendant’s rights may have the legitimate aims of preventing disorder or crime and protecting 
the rights and freedoms of others, it is arguable that an ASBO is disproportionate where it goes 
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beyond merely prohibiting the defendant’s anti-social behaviour and imposes restrictions on prior 
forms of behaviour which are not themselves anti-social.97 
However, other draconian uses of ASBOs stem not from the wide-ranging discretion 
which s1(6) vests in magistrates drafting the terms of Orders, but from the freedom which 
s1(1)(a) confers on enforcement agencies to invoke the legislation in a wide range of different 
contexts.  For example, Mitch Hawkin was threatened with an ASBO for publishing on a website 
a spoof advert for the job of Pope following the death of John Paul II.98  Taxi drivers in North 
Wales have been told that if they beep their horn as they pick up customers they may face an 
ASBO.99  A report prepared for the Scottish Executive has proposed the use of ASBOs against 
people caught feeding gulls in Scottish towns and cities.100  Farmer Brian Hagan was issued with 
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an ASBO which prohibited him from letting his pigs and geese escape.101  And a 13 year-old 
autistic boy was served with an ASBO after neighbours complained about the noise the boy was 
making when jumping on his trampoline – notwithstanding the fact that the local authority were 
aware he had autism and that trampolining has been found to be therapeutic for people with 
autism.102  All of these situations are far removed from the Finnie brothers and Family X type 
scenarios for which the Order was designed.  So too is the ASBO which banned Kim Sutton, a 23 
year-old woman from Odd Down, from jumping into rivers, canals or onto railway lines after she 
had attempted suicide on four occasions.103  At her appeal against the Order, Sutton’s counsel not 
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only argued that her personality disorder meant that she needed help and that legal sanctions 
could in fact be counter-productive, but also that the effect of the ASBO was to criminalise 
suicide and attempted suicide, which are not criminal offences.104  The effect of the Order was 
thus to create what one commentary on the Crime and Disorder Act described as ‘a form of 
personalised criminal law.’105  Proponents of the ASBO have responded to such uses of the Order 
by arguing that examples such as these are exceptional.106  Even if this is true – and the list of 
outlandish uses of ASBOs does appear to be growing ever longer – the fact remains that the effect 
of the definition of anti-social behaviour in s1(1)(a) is to confer on enforcement agencies the 
power to apply for, and obtain, ASBOs in these sorts of situations.107  As we have seen, when the 
critics expressed concern that this would happen, New Labour responded by reassuring them that 
in practice ASBOs would be used appropriately.  Experience has shown that this is not always the 
case. 
The use of ASBOs in three other contexts – against young people, prostitutes and beggars 
– has also given cause for concern.108  From June 2000 (when age breakdowns first became 
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available) to the end of 2003, 991 of the 1892 ASBOs issued (52 per cent) were imposed on 10-
17 year-olds,109 even though it was originally intended that ASBOs would not be routinely used 
against those aged under 18.110  The constraints of space mean that the use of ASBOs against this 
age group cannot be explored in detail here.111  Suffice it to say that it is not merely the fact that 
the Government performed a U-turn, revising its guidance after the Crime and Disorder Bill 
received Royal Assent,112 which is of concern.  The civil classification of applications for ASBOs 
means, inter alia, that applications are heard in the adults’ magistrates’ court instead of the youth 
court and that the presumption in favour of anonymity is reversed.113  The Youth Justice Board 
have also expressed concern that the ASBO process is seen by some ‘as a way of “fast-tracking” 
problem young people into custody.’114  The routine invocation of the ASBO against those aged 
under 18 thus threatens to undermine fundamental principles of juvenile justice. 
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Following Campbell’s Home Office Research Study – which found that, out of a sample 
of ninety-five cases, in five per cent the behaviour which led to an ASBO was prostitution115 – the 
Home Office added prostitution to the list of behaviours which might give rise to an Order in its 
guidance published in November 2002.116  ASBOs which prohibit prostitutes from soliciting, or 
which exclude them from a specified area altogether, are designed to act as a powerful deterrent.  
But while an ASBO may provide some temporary respite for locals, Jones and Sager note that 
‘what research there is indicates that exclusion will not deter street prostitution but simply 
relocate or bury the problem.’  They go on to say that ‘Crucially, both displacement and 
concealment may pre-empt any possibility of “rehabilitation” by placing the women out of reach 
of assistance from health and welfare agencies that the Crime and Disorder Act ostensibly seeks 
to facilitate.’117  Furthermore, it is likely that many prostitutes will breach any ASBO imposed on 
them, for reasons such as drug dependency, poverty and pressure from pimps.118  And where an 
Order is breached, custody is likely to follow.  Indeed, there are already numerous examples of 
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prostitutes who have been sentenced to periods of imprisonment for breaching an ASBO.119  
Resorting to the use of custodial sentences against prostitutes undermines section 71 of the 
Criminal Justice Act 1982, which abolished the use of imprisonment for ‘common prostitutes’ 
found guilty of loitering or soliciting in a street or public place for the purpose of prostitution 
(section 1(1) of the Street Offences Act 1959).  Jones and Sager thus warn that ‘we may find the 
Crime and Disorder Act returns the street prostitute to an era of crime control castigated in 
parliament as iniquitous and causing unacceptable hardship.’120  What is more, the decision to 
return to this era was not made by Parliament acting in its legislative capacity, but by 
enforcement agencies exercising their discretion to use the ASBO in a context for which the 
Order was not intended. 
Much of this applies equally to the use of ASBOs against beggars.  There are now many 
examples of Orders banning individuals not just from aggressive begging, but also non-
aggressive begging.121  Crisis have doubted the effectiveness of using enforcement measures such 
as ASBOs and fines to tackle begging, stating that ‘Bans from public spaces often simply displace 
the problem of begging, moving it from one area of the city to another and homeless people are ill 
placed to pay fines.  In both instances there is a danger that the problems facing vulnerable 
homeless people are exacerbated.’122  More fundamentally, they argue that ‘Although the act of 
begging may be deemed anti-social, it is a problem that is best understood and dealt with as a 
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manifestation of social exclusion.’123  Indeed, the use of ASBOs against prostitutes and beggars 
led NAPO to state that ‘the original purpose of the ASBO has been abused in some areas.  In 
many incidents, individuals are receiving a custodial sentence where the original offence was not 
itself imprisonable … The ASBO is clearly, therefore, moving offenders up tariff and resulting in 
the inappropriate use of custody.’124  
Although the discussion hitherto has focussed on the use of the ASBO in contexts for 
which it was not designed, critics of s1(1)(a) were equally concerned at the discretion vested in 
enforcement agencies dealing with cases involving neighbours.  It is important to recognise that, 
although in many such cases the attribution of blame may be straightforward, this is not always 
the case.  For example, after meeting three juveniles who were subject to ASBOs, their families, 
and the victims of their anti-social behaviour, the journalist Decca Aitkenhead concluded that ‘So 
much of these families’ narrative is unknowable – the chaos of local feuds, the self-delusion and 
counter-allegation (“You look in her rubbish bins, you’ll not find food, it’s all empty cider 
bottles”) – that very few observations can be made with confidence.’125  The ASBO imposed on 
87 year-old Alexander Muat,126 for example, followed an eight year dispute with his neighbours.  
In fact, part of the behaviour which gave rise to the Order was Muat’s use of CCTV cameras to 
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film his neighbours, notwithstanding the fact that he had installed the cameras to prove his claims 
that his neighbours had vandalised his property and that Muat had showed the court a video of his 
flowerbeds being trampled by his neighbour.  Significantly, the Restorative Justice Consortium 
have reported that ‘It is the common experience of community mediation services … that the 
party who reports a dispute has sometimes contributed to it, whether by anti-social behaviour of 
their own or by the manner in which they approached the other party.’  They accordingly 
recommend greater use of mediation, saying that it ‘can often defuse the tension and promote 
better understanding between the parties and an appreciation of underlying personal difficulties 
… Impressively, an agreement can be reached in eight or nine cases out of ten when the parties 
agree to meet.’127  More constructive interventions of this kind may be precluded by resorting to 
the ASBO too readily. 
The danger that ASBOs may be resorted to too readily is exacerbated by the fact that 
decisions to apply for an ASBO are made against the background of Home Office pressure to 
utilise the Order128 as well as substantial pressure from victims, the wider community and the 
media to deal with notorious perpetrators of anti-social behaviour.  In the case of the Morris 
triplets – nicknamed the ‘terror triplets’ by the tabloids – one source close to the case described 
the 13 year-olds as ‘victims of politics.’  The triplets all suffered from Attention Deficit 
Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), whilst two of them were epileptic and the third suffered from a 
speech impediment.  Tellingly, the YOT report on the triplets stated that ‘Until recently support 
has been episodic rather than consistent … [There is] no evidence that there has ever been a 
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multi-agency plan for this family.’129  Similar to this case is the one of Aneeze Williamson.  An 
illiterate 11 year-old, who was excluded from school at the age of seven, Aneeze’s father left 
when he was six weeks old.  After the ASBO was imposed Aneeze’s mother, who herself 
suffered from alcohol problems, urged ‘he needs help, the right sort of help ... and I need help 
with him.’  Journalist Bob Graham, who spent three days with the family, agreed, concluding, ‘It 
was obvious that there was a compelling need for help.’130  A similar case involving an adult is 
that of 44 year-old Jennifer Ford, who received an interim ASBO after being accused of 
intimidating behaviour towards elderly neighbours in her council accommodation.  Ford, an 
alcoholic with mental health problems, subsequently breached the terms of the interim ASBO by 
consuming alcohol in the city centre and was imprisoned for four weeks.  Liberty spokesman 
Doug Jewell lamented, ‘In this case, an ASBO was simply not an appropriate way to deal with 
what is a serious issue.  Whether Ms Ford has mental problems or not, she is clearly an alcoholic, 
whose problems need to be dealt with constructively to prevent the whole scenario occurring 
again.’131 
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This examination of the use made of ASBOs reveals that New Labour’s confidence that 
enforcement agencies could be entrusted with the wide-ranging discretion conferred by s1(1)(a) 
was ill-founded.  As well as employing the ASBO as a heavy-handed instrument for social 
control in contexts where the use of a potentially onerous Order, backed up by the threat of five 
years’ imprisonment, is not appropriate, enforcement agencies have displayed an inclination to 
apply for ASBOs in neighbour disputes when other forms of intervention would have been more 
constructive.  The question which arises is whether there is a way of amending the definition in 
s1(1)(a) which would limit the discretion conferred on enforcement agencies, thereby 
safeguarding against the inappropriate use of ASBOs, whilst at the same time preserving the 
flexibility to invoke the Order against all the potential forms of anti-social behaviour which might 
occur in the Finnie brothers and Family X type scenarios.  Contrary to the suggestion of the 
Home Affairs Committee, the final section of this article will argue that this is possible. 
 
REFINING THE s1(1)(a) DEFINITION OF ‘ANTI-SOCIAL BEHAVIOUR’ 
 
When approaching the task of defining anti-social behaviour a fundamental distinction 
must be drawn between tightness and clarity of definition.  A vaguely worded definition can be 
tightly-drawn, just as a clearly worded definition can be extremely broad.  Suppose, for example, 
that after an unusually dry Winter a state legislature is considering how to preserve the nation’s 
sparse water supply.  One proposal, a ban on the use of hosepipes, is extremely clearly worded 
and is also narrowly drawn, focusing as it does on just one form of water usage which might lead 
to waste.  By contrast, a proposal to limit citizens to just fifteen litres of water per day, although 
equally clear, is far broader, restricting all forms of water usage.  Indeed it is probably over-
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inclusive, encompassing not just culpable individuals who wastefully use too much water, but 
also many blameless people who exceed their quota for reasons of genuine need.  An offence of 
‘the deliberate use of an excessive amount of water’ would be much narrower than a blanket 15 
litre quota, but is much less precise (what is an excessive amount of water?).  Indeed, since much 
water wastage is careless, not deliberate, it is probably too tightly drawn.  A strict liability offence 
of ‘water wastage’ would be much broader.  But it too is vague (what amounts to water 
wastage?). 
This section will show that, when rejecting various amendments which would have 
narrowed the scope of s1(1)(a),132 New Labour erroneously conflated tightness and clarity of 
definition.  It will be argued that the ASBO was designed to apply to serious, persistent, culpable 
misconduct, and so the definition of anti-social behaviour in s1(1)(a) should be qualified 
accordingly in order to tighten its scope.  It will then be argued that greater certainty could be 
engendered by adding a further two clauses to s1(1) aimed at communicating the original spirit 
and purpose of the ASBO.  These changes, it will be argued, will not result in inflexibility. 
 
Tightening the definition of anti-social behaviour 
 
The boundaries of s1(1)(a) stretch far beyond the range of behaviour that the ASBO was 
designed to combat.  First, the ASBO was targeted at perpetrators of behaviour who were 
culpable.  The remedy was designed ‘for communities that are ground down by the chronic 
bullying and harassment by a selfish minority.’133  The Home Office guidance published in 2002, 
for example, states that anti-social behaviour covers ‘a whole complex of thoughtless, 
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inconsiderate or malicious activity.’134  Yet there is nothing in the definition in s1(1)(a) which 
reflects this requirement of culpability – a mens rea element along the lines of ‘knowing or 
believing that others would be, or were likely to be, caused harassment, alarm or distress’ would 
therefore seem apposite.  Second, the Order was aimed at individuals who persistently engage in 
anti-social behaviour: 
 
The main test [when considering whether the use an ASBO would be appropriate] is that 
there is a pattern of behaviour which continues over a period of time but cannot be dealt 
with easily or adequately through the prosecution of those concerned for a single 
‘snapshot’ or criminal event.135 
 
Indeed, New Labour justified the severe maximum penalty for breach of an Order by 
pointing to the fact that it was designed to reflect the seriousness of ‘a pattern of behaviour that is 
damaging people’s lives over a considerable period of time.’136  Yet, as Andrew Ashworth 
remarked, ‘Does [the word persistent] appear in section 1 of the Crime and Disorder Act as 
something to be proved by the local authority seeking an order?  No, it does not.’137  And third, 
the ASBO targets serious misconduct.  New Labour hoped that the remedy would ‘make it clear 
to offenders that persistent, serious anti-social behaviour will not be tolerated.’138  This is 
underlined by the two case studies found in A Quiet Life.  Both the members of Family X and the 
Finnie brothers were responsible ‘for serious anti-social behaviour.’139  Yet despite being targeted 
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at perpetrators of this kind of behaviour – behaviour which ‘ruin[s] the lives of individuals, 
families or communities’140 – s1(1)(a) does not state that the conduct giving rise to the Order 
must have been of a serious nature. 
When amendments that would have added a mens rea requirement and a requirement that 
the anti-social behaviour was serious were suggested during the parliamentary debates on the 
Crime and Disorder Bill,141 New Labour rejected them on the basis that a tighter definition could 
prove too rigid and inflexible.  This reasoning is flawed, because it fails to distinguish between 
tightness of definition and clarity of definition.  The flexibility of s1(1)(a) stems from the 
elasticity of the definition of anti-social behaviour as behaviour which caused/was likely to cause 
harassment, alarm or distress.  But even if s1(1)(a) were amended, so as to require that the anti-
social behaviour was serious and persistent and that the perpetrator was culpable, the core 
definition of anti-social behaviour as behaviour which caused/was likely to cause harassment, 
alarm or distress would remain intact.  Qualifying the definition in the way suggested142 would 
thus not prevent the invocation of the ASBO against all potential forms of anti-social behaviour 
in the Finnie brothers and Family X type scenarios. 
 
Clarifying the definition of anti-social behaviour 
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Whilst the addition of requirements that the anti-social behaviour was persistent and 
serious and that the perpetrator was culpable would narrow the scope of s1(1)(a), the basic 
definition of anti-social behaviour as behaviour which caused/was likely to cause harassment, 
alarm or distress would remain just as imprecise as before.  It might even be argued that adding 
nebulous concepts such as seriousness and persistence to s1(1)(a) would render it even less 
certain.  Given that critics have expressed severe misgivings about the vagueness of the definition 
of anti-social behaviour in s1(1)(a), it might therefore seem surprising that no clearer 
formulations have been put forward as alternatives.143  The reason, it is suggested, is the nature of 
the behaviour being defined.  As the case studies from A Quiet Life illustrate, the behaviour 
giving rise to an Order might include burglary, robbery, theft, criminal damage, harassment, 
intimidation, public disorder, threatening behaviour, noise nuisance, racial abuse, vehicle crime, 
and assault.  The reasons for wanting to ensure that these many forms of behaviour may form part 
of the course of conduct that can give rise to an ASBO have already been outlined.  However, any 
definition of a term which purports to include within its scope such a long list of different forms 
of misconduct must inevitably be framed at a high level of abstraction.  The impossibility of 
framing a definition which is clear and lucid, and which also encompasses such a diverse range of 
behaviour whilst excluding from its scope both the actions of the eccentric and unconventional 
and more trivial forms of misbehaviour, is obvious.144  In short, some degree of vagueness is 
unavoidable when seeking to define an umbrella term like anti-social behaviour. 
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Although it is problematic, the rules/discretion dichotomy underlies the critics’ concerns 
about the vagueness of the definition of anti-social behaviour.  A clear, precise definition of anti-
social behaviour is assumed to be necessary if citizens are to be given fair warning of what 
behaviour is proscribed by s1(1)(a) and if discriminatory use of the legislation is to be avoided.  
However, just as carefully crafted rules may not drive out discretion, so conversely may 
principles engender just as much certainty as rules (if not more).145  The addition of two new 
clauses to s1(1), aimed at expounding and explicating the principles underlying the ASBO, is 
accordingly proposed here.  This suggestion is particularly important given that the critics’ calls 
for clarity of definition are beset by the hopelessness of trying to define an umbrella term like 
‘anti-social behaviour’ precisely.   
The first of these clauses would set out three conditions which must be satisfied for an 
ASBO to be imposed.  These conditions identify the key features of the Finnie brothers and 
Family X case studies – namely, that the persistent anti-social acts took place in the same area so 
that the same people were repeatedly affected, that the anti-social acts amounted to criminal 
offences of a certain level of seriousness, and that a composite sentence was deemed to be 
necessary to adequately reflect the aggregate impact of the behaviour.  Whilst such a provision 
may not elucidate the legal definition of anti-social behaviour any further, Braithwaite’s study of 
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nursing homes in Australia and the US suggests that it might nevertheless engender certainty.  For 
even though regulation of nursing homes in the US was by way of a multiplicity of specific 
‘standards’ – more than a thousand in most US states – the Australian regulatory scheme, which 
consisted of 31 broadly-phrased outcome-oriented standards, delivered a greater degree of 
consistency.  This was in part attributable to the fact that the smaller number of broad standards 
meant that, in contrast to the legal realist approach of US inspectors (who, since they could not 
plausibly be expected to employ every one of the hundreds of different standards, tended to 
intuitively decide whether a standard had been breached and then search for an appropriate 
regulation), Australian inspectors engaged in the task of deliberating over whether a standard had 
been met.146  Similarly, a provision which expounds the key features of the type of situation for 
which the ASBO was designed, and identifies these as necessary prerequisites for the imposition 
of an Order, would harbour consideration of whether a given case is the sort of one for which the 
ASBO was intended.147 
The conditions laid down by this clause would then be further explicated by the use of a 
series of illustrative examples.  As Kenneth Culp Davis has pointed out, ‘a rule need not be in the 
form of an abstract generalization; a rule can be limited to resolving one or more hypothetical 
cases, without generalizing.’148  Davis’ observation is of particular relevance to the ASBO, given 
that the Order was designed with cases like the Finnie brothers and Family X in mind.  Taking 
these case studies, and some of the uses which have been made of the ASBO to date, it is possible 
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to compile a number of examples which indicate, for example, which crimes are/are not of a 
sufficient degree of seriousness for the imposition of an ASBO and when a composite sentence 
may/may not be regarded as necessary.  In so doing they illustrate how the preconditions set out 
in the previous paragraph should be applied.149 
The explication of the thinking behind the ASBO would be reinforced by the second 
proposed new clause.  Rather than attempting to advance a more precise definition of anti-social 
behaviour Ashworth et al argued that ‘reasonable effort could be made to specify the generic 
types of misconduct being addressed.’150  Since anti-social behaviour is an umbrella term this 
suggestion would seem sensible, provided that the list is construed as indicative, not exhaustive.  
Any attempt to devise an exhaustive list would risk excluding unforeseen types of anti-social 
behaviour, which would then create uncertainty as to whether a Magistrate hearing an application 
for an ASBO would be prepared to read that form of misconduct into the list or not.151  An 
expressly non-exhaustive list, on the other hand, would allow unforeseen forms of anti-social 
behaviour to still fall within the scope of s1(1)(a).  It would also give citizens a clear indication of 
some of the forms that the proscribed behaviour could take, and, by revealing something of the 
thinking behind the provision, would help citizens decide whether other forms of misconduct fall 
within the scope of s1(1)(a).  Furthermore, although the Home Affairs Committee rejected the 
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notion that a list of behaviours which are anti-social could be drawn up as ‘unworkable and 
anomalous,’ this conclusion was based on the assumption that the list would be exhaustive.152  
Their concern that ‘different organisations and individuals would doubtless disagree about what 
behaviours should be included’ would thus not apply, since the non-inclusion of a particular form 
of behaviour would not necessarily place it outside the range of behaviour that could give rise to 
an ASBO.  And the concern that ‘a list-based approach would be unable to take account of the 
context, or the frequency, of the behaviour’ would also not apply; a court deciding whether a 
course of anti-social behaviour was persistent and serious, in line with the suggested 
qualifications to s1(1)(a) advanced above, would have to consider both the context and the 
frequency of the behaviour. 
The cumulative effect of the amendments proposed in this article would be to focus the 
ASBO on the sort of case for which it was designed.  Many of the outlandish uses of the ASBO 
detailed previously would have been precluded had s1(1)(a) been qualified to require that the 
behaviour was persistent, that it caused a serious level of harassment, alarm or distress, and that 
the perpetrator was culpable.  This would be bolstered by the addition of the clauses expounding 
and explicating the principles underlying the ASBO.  While, for example, Kim Sutton’s repeated 
suicide attempts may have caused serious harassment to the emergency services, since attempted 
suicide is not a criminal offence she cannot be said to have repeatedly committed criminal 
offences.  Similarly, a prostitute who has, on numerous occasions, loitered and solicited in a 
particular area for the purpose of prostitution cannot be said to have repeatedly committed crimes 
of a sufficient degree of seriousness for the imposition of an ASBO since the offence she has 
repeatedly committed is non-imprisonable.153  And if a herd of pigs escape from their enclosure 
                                                        
152
 Home Affairs Committee Anti-Social Behaviour (n 27 above) vol I, 20. 
153
 The fact that an individual has repeatedly committed the same offence does not make the offence itself 
more serious.  See A. von Hirsch ‘Desert and Previous Convictions in Sentencing’ (1981) 65 Minn L Rev 
 45 
on several occasions, causing hundreds of pounds worth of damage to the property of 
neighbouring landowners, it is hard to see why the farmer who failed to properly fence them in is 
worthy of a composite criminal sentence as opposed to a straightforward prosecution for reckless 
criminal damage.  A new clause which lays down preconditions for the use of the ASBO, based 
on the thinking behind the Order, and which then uses examples such as these to clearly illustrate 
how the preconditions should be applied, would thus help limit the availability of the ASBO to 
the sort of case for which it was originally designed whilst simultaneously preserving the 
flexibility of the core definition of anti-social behaviour as behaviour that caused/was likely to 
cause harassment, alarm or distress.  Moreover, by rendering the ASBO unavailable in many 
situations where it has hitherto been resorted to, the amendments proposed in this article would 
encourage greater use of other, more constructive, forms of intervention in cases such as those 
involving long-running neighbour disputes and individuals suffering from mental health (or other 
underlying) problems.   
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This article has argued that the use of the ASBO to date has shown that New Labour’s 
willingness to entrust enforcement agencies with the wide-ranging discretion conferred by 
s1(1)(a) was mistaken.  Furthermore, their refusal to accept amendments which would have 
narrowed s1(1)(a)’s scope, on the basis that this would result in inflexibility, erroneously 
conflated tightness and clarity of definition.  As well as proposing that the definition in s1(1)(a) 
be tightened, this article has argued that, although anti-social behaviour is an umbrella term which 
defies precise definition, greater certainty could nonetheless be engendered (and sufficient 
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flexibility maintained) by the adoption of two new clauses geared at communicating the spirit of 
the ASBO.  It is accordingly submitted that subsection (1) of section 1 of the Crime and Disorder 
Act 1998 be amended as follows: 
 
(a) An application for an order under this section may be made by a relevant authority if it 
appears to the authority that the following conditions are fulfilled with respect to any person 
aged 18 or over,154 namely— 
(i) that, since the commencement date, the person has persistently engaged in 
serious forms of anti-social behaviour, that is to say, behaviour that caused or was 
likely to cause serious harassment, alarm or distress to one or more persons not of the 
same household as himself;  
(ii) that the person knew or believed that others would be, or were likely to be, 
caused serious harassment, alarm or distress;  
(iii) that the conditions detailed in paragraph (b) are satisfied; and 
(iv) that such an order is necessary to protect relevant persons from further serious 
anti-social acts by him. 
(b) An order should only be imposed under this section if: 
(i) The person’s persistent anti-social acts took place in the same area, so that 
those living in that area were repeatedly affected by his behaviour;  
(ii) The person’s anti-social acts amounted to criminal offences of a sufficient level 
of seriousness; and 
(iii) A composite criminal sentence is regarded as necessary because, if the person 
were successfully prosecuted for any of his anti-social acts, the penalty likely to 
result would be insufficient to reflect the aggregate impact of his course of behaviour. 
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When considering whether these conditions are satisfied, regard should be had to the 
following examples: 
Example Paragraph Facts Response 
A (b)(i), (ii) 
and (iii) 
D commits a series of crimes 
on the estate on which he 
lives, including burglary, 
robbery, theft, criminal 
damage, assault and public 
disorder.  D's behaviour 
causes people living on the 
estate serious distress, 
evidenced by the high level of 
requests for rehousing from 
council tenants and by the 
number of council properties 
which stand vacant for 
excessively long periods.  If 
D were prosecuted for one or 
more of his criminal acts in 
isolation, the likely 
penalty/ies would be 
insufficient to reflect the 
aggregate impact of his 
behaviour. 
A court hearing an application 
under this section should impose an 
Order. 
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B (b)(ii) D, a prostitute, loiters and/or 
solicits in a public place for 
the purpose of prostitution on 
several occasions. 
Any application made for an Order 
under this section should be 
refused.  Although D is guilty, on 
several occasions, of a criminal 
offence (Street Offences Act 1959, 
s1(1)), this crime is not 
imprisonable and so is not of a 
sufficient level of seriousness for 
the imposition of an Order. 
C (b)(ii) and 
(iii) 
D, who suffers from a 
personality disorder, attempts 
suicide on several occasions, 
jumping off of bridges into 
rivers. 
Any application made for an Order 
under this section should be 
refused.  Attempted suicide is not a 
criminal offence.  And since D 
suffers from a personality disorder 
other forms of intervention are 
more appropriate, and so a 
composite sentence cannot be 
regarded as necessary. 
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D (b)(iii) D is a pig farmer.  One day, 
his pigs escape and damage 
the property of D's neighbour, 
E.  D recaptures his pigs and 
places them back in their 
enclosure, but does not take 
any steps to prevent them 
escaping again.  The next day 
the pigs escape again, and 
once more damage E's 
property.  The same then 
happens again, and E's 
property is damaged a third 
time. 
Any application made for an Order 
under this section should be 
refused.  D may be prosecuted for 
recklessly causing criminal damage 
to E's property.  A composite 
sentence cannot be regarded as 
necessary to reflect the aggregate 
impact of D's behaviour. 
E (b)(iii) D is an alcoholic with mental 
health problems.  As well as 
verbally abusing and 
threatening his neighbours, 
these illnesses cause D to 
commit acts of noise 
nuisance, public disorder, and 
criminal damage. 
Any application for an Order under 
this section should be refused.  
Since there are other possible forms 
of intervention, aimed at addressing 
the underlying causes of D's 
behaviour, a composite sentence 
cannot be regarded as necessary.   
(c) Those forms of behaviour which may be considered for the purposes of paragraph (a) 
include burglary, robbery, theft, criminal damage, harassment, intimidation, public disorder, 
threatening behaviour, noise nuisance, racial abuse, vehicle crime, and assault. 
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The effect of this proposal would be to limit the ASBO to its original purpose – a means 
of imposing composite sentences on individuals who persistently commit criminal acts of a 
certain level of seriousness in a particular area, making the lives of those living there unbearable. 
Two further issues remain.  The first is the appropriate bounds of a composite sentence.  
Even if one shares the view that a composite sentence should be imposed on courses of conduct 
like the Finnie brothers’ and Family X’s, this aspect of the ASBO needs greater discussion than it 
has received hitherto.  There are further points to consider concerning how the increase in 
sentence severity should be quantified (it might be argued that, even employing composite 
sentencing, the five year maximum sentence for breach of an ASBO is too severe).  And fuller 
discussion of the principles of composite sentencing might lead to consideration of other contexts 
in which composite sentencing should be applied. 
The second remaining issue is that, although the ASBO was designed to provide a 
mechanism for imposing composite sentences, this has not happened in practice.  Campbell’s 
Home Office Research Study found that, of the 85 incidents of breach of an ASBO brought 
before the courts in 2000 (involving 51 individuals and 75 breach hearings), 64 (75 per cent) were 
sentenced in the magistrates’ court and only five (6 per cent) were committed to the Crown Court 
(four for sentence and one for trial).  The magistrates dealing with these incidents of breach thus 
regarded few of them as serious enough to be committed to the Crown Court for sentencing.  
Moreover, of those incidents of breach which were sentenced in the magistrates’ court, only 62 
per cent resulted in a custodial sentence.155  This trend has continued since.  Of the 793 people 
who breached an ASBO between 1 June 2000 and the end of 2003, 356 (45 per cent) escaped a 
custodial sentence.156  This has led Rod Hansen, Larry Bill and Ken Pease to express 
‘amazement’ at the fact that ‘an offender escapes custody in almost half the cases where the 
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[ASBO] is breached, presumably because the focus of the court reverts to evidence on a single 
event which may of itself not be serious and the principle of limiting retribution resumes its 
place.’157  There are, it is suggested, at least two reasons for this shift in focus.  First, where an 
Order contains unnecessarily wide-ranging prohibitions, a sentencing court may be reluctant to 
impose a severe sentence following a trivial act of breach, eg, visiting one’s friend in a fifth floor 
flat or parking in a supermarket car park to buy one’s groceries.  This problem could be 
straightforwardly addressed by approaching the task of drafting the terms of ASBOs in a more 
measured way, taking due account of a defendant’s rights under the ECHR.  After all, imposing 
wide-ranging prohibitions in order to be seen to be tough on anti-social behaviour is self-
defeating if it merely results in sentencing courts imposing lesser sentences in the event of 
breach.158  Second, in order to justify classifying the ASBO as civil in nature the courts have 
stressed that proceedings for the imposition of an Order are distinct from proceedings for 
breach.159  But emphasising the separateness of the two sets of proceedings in this way sends out 
the signal that the conduct which was taken into account at the application for the Order should 
not be considered again at the proceedings for breach.  Far from insisting on the separateness of 
the two sets of proceedings, the connection between the two should be emphasised, so that 
findings of fact from the application for an ASBO can be taken into account at any subsequent 
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proceedings for breach.  This would entail reclassifying the ASBO as criminal in nature,160 
something which the House of Lords in McCann were loath to do on the basis that, given the 
problem of witness intimidation in cases of neighbour nuisance, the non-admissibility of hearsay 
evidence would render the ASBO ineffectual.161  Following the implementation of the new 
hearsay provisions in the Criminal Justice Act 2003, however, it must be doubted whether the 
classification of the ASBO as criminal in nature would have this effect.   
Notwithstanding the fact that the ASBO was a carefully crafted response to a ‘real social 
evil,’162 there is growing opposition to the remedy.  One of the major reasons for this dissent is 
the use of ASBOs in contexts for which they were neither designed nor suited and in situations 
where other more constructive forms of intervention are possible.  Such uses of the Order are 
possible because of the permissive wording of s1(1)(a).  The implementation of the proposals 
advanced in this article would help concentrate the use of ASBOs on the type of situation for 
which they were purportedly intended and perhaps go some way to restoring their credibility. 
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